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RIGHT TO COUNSEL-AUTOMOBILES: INTOXILYZER
TESTS HELD ADMISSIBLE EVEN IF "QUALIFIED
RIGHT" TO COUNSEL WAS DENIED
On January 1, 1989, Sheriff Duane Snider of the Morton
County Sheriff's Department observed Julie Fasching driving
erratically and proceeded to stop her vehicle.1 While speaking
with Fasching after the vehicle had been stopped, Sheriff Snider
concluded from his observations that Fasching had been drinking
alcohol.' At this point, Sheriff Snider requested that Fasching per-
form field sobriety tests in the patrol car.3 Debra Holter, a passen-
ger in Fasching's vehicle, identified herself as an attorney and
expressed her desire to be with Fasching in the patrol car during
these tests. 4 Holter's request was denied.5 Upon completion of
the field sobriety tests, Fasching was arrested and taken to the
Mandan Law Enforcement Center, whereupon an intoxilyzer test
was administered with the results being in excess of the statutory
limit.6
Fasching and Holter testified at the administrative hearing
that their requests to consult with each other prior to the adminis-
tration of the intoxilyzer test were denied.7 Sheriff Snider testified
that Fasching consented to the intoxilyzer test after having been
informed of her right to consult with an attorney." The decision of
the administrative hearing concluded that Fasching was allowed
to consult with her attorney." The hearing officer at the adminis-
1. Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990). Sheriff Snider testified at the
administrative hearing that he followed Fasching's vehicle eastbound on Interstate 94 from
exit 31 to exit 32. Transcript of admin. hearing at 3-4, appendix of appeal, Fasching v.
Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990).
2. Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990).
3. Id. The sobriety tests included the alphabet recital, the numerical countdown, and
the horizontal gaze nystagmus. Transcript of admin. hearing at 11, appendix of appeal,
Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990). Sheriff Snider testified that Fasching's
performance of these tests indicated the possibility of being under the influence of alcohol.
Id. at 9-10.
4. Fasching, 452 N.W.2d at 324.
5. Id.
6. Id. North Dakota sets the limit for blood alcohol concentration at one-hundredth of
one percent. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01(1Xa) (Supp. 1989). Fasching was administered a
temporary drivers license, and she filed for an administrative hearing. Fasching, 452
N.W.2d at 324-25.
7. Id. at 325. Fasching argued that her arrest was illegal, and therefore all evidence
should be suppressed. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. The commissioner stated, "I believe that, or I know from the testimony that Ms.
Fasching was allowed advice from her attorney on the test, but that it was not used,
according to the testimony, and she was more concerned if the attorney was okay"
(emphasis added). Transcript of admin. hearing at 31, appendix of appeal, Fasching v.
Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990).
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trative hearing suspended Fasching's driving privileges for 364
days.' o However, the district court stated,
"[t]he record of the administrative hearing, including
Ms. Holter's deposition, is quite clear that Ms. Fasching
asked the officers several times to see or talk to Ms.
Holter .... Ms. Holter repeatedly asked the then present
officers for the opportunity to actually talk with and con-
sult with Ms. Fasching.... Each request by Ms. Holter
and Ms. Fasching was denied or put off.""
The district court for the County of Morton reversed the suspen-
sion and reinstated Fasching's driving privileges.' 2  The North
Dakota Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that
the results of a properly administered intoxilyzer test were admis-
sible as evidence at a civil administrative hearing, despite the pos-
sible violation of the motorist's right to counsel.' 3 Fasching v.
Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990).
In Miranda v. Arizona,'4 the United States Supreme Court
interpreted the fifth amendment protection against self incrimina-
tion to include the right to counsel when an individual is in an
interrogation situation. 15 Miranda also stated that evidence
obtained as a result of an interrogation in which this protection
was denied could not be used.' 6 Application of Miranda depends
upon what constitutes an interrogation setting and whether the
administration of an intoxilyzer test falls within this definition,
thereby invoking the protection of the fifth amendment.'" How-
ever, in Schmerber v. California,' which the Supreme Court
decided one week after Miranda, it was held that the privilege
against self-incrimination only protects the accused from the
10. Transcript of admin. hearing at 31, appendix of appeal, Fasching v. Backes, 452
N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990).
11. Fasching v. Backes, No. 15700 at 2 (D. N.D. Aug. 30, 1989) (order reversing
commissioner's decision).
12. Id. at 11. The district court relied on the violation of North Dakota Century Code
section 29-05-20 in overturning the commissioner's decision. Id. at 10-11.
13. Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324, 326 (N.D. 1990).
14. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470-71 (1966). The court reasoned that the need
for counsel does not exist only prior to questioning but is needed during questioning to
guarantee trustworthiness and noncoercion. Id. The fifth amendment specifically states
that "[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
16. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
17. See generally Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (the interrogation setting is where the right
to counsel is indispensable).
18. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Schmerber dealt with the taking of a blood sample, without
consent, to determine blood alcohol content. Id. The court allowed the evidence and
affirmed the conviction. Id. at 772.
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state's using evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.' 9
The holding in Schmerber, in essence, eliminates the question of
whether an accused is denied the fifth amendment right to coun-
sel in relation to intoxilyzer tests because the amendment only
protects against use of testimonial evidence, which does not
include blood and intoxilyzer tests.20
The sixth amendment provides for the assistance of counsel to
the accused in all criminal prosecutions. 21 The United States
Supreme Court, in Powell v. Alabama,2 acknowledged that there
are "critical" periods prior to trial that may require the right to
counsel. 23 This "critical stage" doctrine was elaborated in United
States v. Wade, 4 wherein the Court stated that it must, in each
particular situation, "analyze whether potential substantial preju-
dice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation
and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice. 25
The Court went on to say that situations such as "fingerprints,
blood sample, clothing, hair, and the like" fail to qualify as critical
stages because technical and scientific cross examination at trial is
sufficient to protect the defendant's rights.26 Presumably an intox-
ilyzer test would fall short of the Court's view of what constitutes a
critical stage. However, regardless of when courts are willing to
declare a stage critical, the sixth amendment still applies to crimi-
nal proceedings, and "a majority of the courts draw a distinction
between the criminal nature of the DWI proceeding and the
apparently civil nature of the implied consent proceeding." 2
19. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). In State v. Fasching, the North
Dakota Supreme Court cited Schmerber as support for its conclusion that non-testimonial
evidence can be obtained and admitted without concern for fifth amendment privileges.
State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761, 763 (N.D. 1990).
20. See State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761, 764-65 (N.D. 1990). The court held that
blood test results were admissible and refused to even consider Fasching's argument that
she was denied her right to counsel. Id. at 765.
21. U.S. Const. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial ... and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
Id.
22. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
23. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932).
24. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
25. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
26. Id. at 227-28. For a critical analysis of this position, see Note, To Submit or Not to
Submit-Where is My Attorney? The Right to Counsel Before Submission to Chemical
Testing in a DWI Proceeding, 63 NEB. L. REV. 373, 382 (1984) (the critical decision about
whether to submit has such an impact on the outcome that the effects of that choice are
"critical") [hereinafter Note, To Submit or Not to Submit].
27. See generally United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 (preparatory scientific analysis,
which an intoxilyzer test is, is not critical stage requiring protection).
28. Note, To Submit or Not to Submit, supra note 26, at 379. The North Dakota
Supreme Court accepted the general proposition that constitutional protections afforded
criminal defendants are not applicable to civil proceedings. See Holen v. Hjelle, 396
1991]
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In addition to the possible application of constitutional right to
counsel, several states have passed statutes granting individuals
the right to counsel."9 North Dakota has passed such a statute,30
which the North Dakota Supreme Court interpreted in Kuntz v.
State Highway Commissioner.3' In Kuntz, the court held that a
person arrested has a "qualified" right to an attorney and must be
given a reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel prior to
taking an intoxilyzer test.32
The North Dakota Legislature has clearly chosen to take a
tough public stance on driving under the influence (DUI) by pass-
ing section 29-06-15 of the North Dakota Century Code.33 This
statute allows for the arrest, without a warrant, of a person reason-
ably suspected of drinking and driving.34 In enacting this statute
the legislature apparently has recognized the immediacy of the
arrest situation which calls for more police discretion. 35  The
Supreme Court also noted some of the emergency characteristics
that an arrest for DUI might involve, such as the destruction of
N.W.2d 290, 294 (N.D. 1986) (discusses whether, at the time of collection of the evidence,
there is really a distinction between the civil license suspension proceedings and the
criminal DWI action since the decision of which of these to pursue has not yet been made).
But see Note, To Submit or Not to Submit, supra note 26, at 379 (discusses the reasons why a
majority of courts have recognized a distinction). In addition, language in Kuntz v. State
Highway Commissioner appears to question the distinction by stating, "The civil and
criminal consequences are so intermingled that they are not perceptibly different to a lay
person." Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D. 1987).
29. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 481.10 (Supp. 1989); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 544.170 (Vernon
1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2(a) (1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 1202(c) (1989) (these
statutes place some reasonableness limit on this right to counsel, such as, "as soon as
practicable" or "at all reasonable hours").
30. N.D. Cent. Code § 29-05-20 (1989). The text of North Dakota's right to counsel
statute is as follows:
The accused in all cases must be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary
delay, and any attorney at law entitled to practice in the courts of record of this
state, at his request, may visit such person after his arrest.
Id.
31. 405 N.W.2d 285, 287 (N.D. 1987). The motorist in Kuntz refused to take the test
and had his license revoked. Id. The district court upheld the revocation but the supreme
court reversed, holding that the motorist's right to counsel under North Dakota Century
Code section 29-05-20 had been violated. Id.
32. Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1987). The court
stated that the right to counsel is a qualified right because it cannot be used merely to
interfere with the police officer's administration of the test. Id.
33. N.D. Cent. Code § 29-06-15(lXf) (Supp. 1989). The text of this statute provides in
pertinent part:
1. A law enforcement officer without a warrant, may arrest a person:
f. On a charge, made upon reasonable cause of driving or being in actual
physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic
beverages.
Id.
34. Id.
35. See generally 1969 N.D. LAws ch 91, § 4 (amending the section which allows
warrantless searches to include driving while intoxicated).
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evidence, and on this basis held in Schmerber that the tests were
proper.36
Difficulties arise when the right to counsel conflicts with
implied consent laws. 37 To deal with the increasing risks and dan-
gers presented by drunken drivers, every state has passed implied
consent laws.38  These laws provide that upon receiving driving
privileges, each motorist "consents" to submit to alcohol testing,
and that refusal to submit to testing can result in the suspension or
revocation of driving privileges. 39 Attacks on the constitutionality
of implied consent statutes have generally failed.40 The North
Dakota implied consent statute was passed in 1959,4 1 and it has
since been interpreted by the North Dakota Supreme Court on
many occasions.42 A chronological examination of the changing
interpretation of this statute will help to clarify the court's present
position.43
In 1974, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Agnew v.
Hjelle.44 In Agnew, the motorist was arrested and, upon request,
was allowed to call his attorney.45 The attorney, however, was also
the city prosecutor and informed Agnew he could not advise or
represent him.46 Agnew alleged that as a result of not speaking
with an attorney, he was confused about his Miranda rights and
the ramifications of refusing to submit to testing.47
Agnew contends that, without the advice of counsel, his deci-
36. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966). The court voiced its concern
that the evidence of the blood alcohol content would be lost, and on this basis upheld the
admissibility of the evidence. Id.
37. See Implied Consent Statutes: What is Refusal?, 9 AMj. TRIAL ADvoc. 423, 431(1986) (difficulty is dealt with by applying a reasonableness test; if the exercise of the right to
counsel unreasonably interferes with the testing, then the defendant can be required to
submit to testing) [hereinafter Implied Consent Statutes: What is Refusal?].
38. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 28.35.031-.032 (1990); ARZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-691(Supp. 1990); CAL. VEH. CODE § 13353(a) (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 42-4-1202(3Xa)(1984 & Supp. 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123(2) (West 1990).
39. Implied Consent Statute: What is Refusal?, supra note 37, at 425. North Dakota's
implied consent statute provides for revocation of driving privileges for up to three years.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (1987).
40. Implied consent statutes: What is refusal?, supra note 37, at 425-27. These attacks
have ranged from due process and self-incrimination attacks to allegations that the statutes
are ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. Id.
41. 1959 N.D. LAws ch. 286, § 1.
42. See, e.g., Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1987); Holte v.
North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989).
43. See, e.g., Kuntz, 405 N.W.2d at 285; Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 250; Bickler v. North
Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 423 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1988) (these cases demonstrate the
development of the court's view).
44. 216 N.W.2d 291 (N.D. 1974).
45. Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W.2d 291, 293 (N.D. 1974).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 296. The court noted that "[t]he so called 'confusion doctrine' has been
asserted with success under limited circumstances in California." Id. at 297.
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sion to refuse testing was not knowledgeable and therefore should
not be considered a refusal at all under North Dakota Century
Code section 39-20-01.48 The supreme court did not find support
in the record for the contention that Agnew was so confused that
his response was not a refusal under the implied consent law.49
In 1987, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided Kuntz v.
State Highway Commissioner,50 holding that there was a statuto-
rily created "qualified" right to counsel, and that if this right was
denied, failure to take an alcohol test could not be considered a
refusal.-" In Kuntz, the court stated its approval of the rationale
expressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, 2 which held that a
motorist is entitled to consult with counsel prior to rendering a
decision about whether to submit to chemical tests.53
In Prideaux v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 4 the Minnesota
Supreme Court attacked the rationale of not applying constitu-
tional protections to these administrative hearings simply because
of the "civil" label which is attached to them.55 The court
expressed three main reasons why this label should not be control-
ling.56 First, the court was concerned with the fact that the civil
proceeding is so intertwined with the criminal proceeding that the
evidence can be used for both. 7 Second, the court saw very little
48. Id. at 296. The arresting officers testified that they attempted to explain the
process but Agnew continued to refuse. Id. at 297.
49. Id. at 298. The court appears to have rejected this doctrine, stating: -[e]ven if we
were to recognize the existence in this state of such a doctrine, which we do not .... Id.
50. 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1987).
51. Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 285-86 (N.D. 1987). The court
in Kuntz stated, "[w]e do not exclude any evidence, but we hold that the evidence of failure
to take a test under these circumstances is not a 'refusal."' Id. at 286 n.1. Kuntz was
decided by a three person majority consisting of Justice Meschke, Justice Gierke, and Justice
Levine. Id. at 290.
52. See, e.g., Prideaux v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385
(1976). But see Nyflot v. Commission of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 1985)
(interpreted the Minnesota implied consent statute as amended in 1984). The amendment
took away the right to counsel prior to testing. Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 515.
53. Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 287 (N.D. 1987).
54. 310 Minn. 405, 247 N.W.2d 385 (1976). In 1984, Minnesota amended its statute to
take away the limited right to counsel which was recognized in Prideaux. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 169.123 (West 1986). The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed that these
amendments were meant to remove the right which was recognized in Prideaux. Nyflot v.
Comm'r of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 515 (Minn. 1985). However, the reasoning in
Prideaux is still valid in North Dakota because the North Dakota legislature has not
amended its statutes as did Minnesota. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-05-20 (1974).
Prior to publication of this article, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared section
169.123 unconstitutional and distinguished the Nyflot case. Friedman v. Commissioner of
Public Safety, 1991 WL 94424 (Minn.) (decided June 7, 1991). Therefore, Minnesota has
reacknowledged the qualified right to counsel that was recognized in the Prideaux case.
55. Prideaux v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405, -, 247 N.W.2d 385, 388
(1976).
56. Id. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 388-89.
57. Id. at __ 247 N.W.2d at 388-89. Presumably this point is irrelevant in North
Dakota since the evidence is not testimonial, and therefore it cannot be suppressed in
116
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difference in severity between the license suspension and some of
the normal criminal sanctions.m Third, the court cited United
States v. Wade"9 and argued that the proceeding fell within the
definition of a critical stage and, therefore, in order to protect the
defendant's right to a fair proceeding, constitutional protections
must apply.60
The Kuntz majority also questioned the validity of the distinc-
tion between civil and criminal proceedings, stating that "the civil
and criminal consequences are so intermingled that they are not
perceptibly different to a lay person."'6 1 The motorist in Kuntz
refused to submit to an intoxilyzer test and the commissioner
revoked his driver's license for two years, but the supreme court
reversed because the right to counsel was denied.62 The court
later interpreted this qualified right to counsel to require an "out-
of-earshot" consultation with counsel provided that there was no
substantial interference in the testing procedure, thereby
affirming Kuntz yet applying useful boundaries.6 3 The North
Dakota Supreme Court then decided Holte v. North Dakota State
Highway Commissioner,64 in which the court distinguished the
Kuntz decision by stating that it addressed the narrow issue of
what constitutes a refusal under North Dakota Century Code sec-
tion 39-20-01.65 In Holte, after requests to consult with counsel
were denied, the motorist submitted to an intoxilyzer test.66 The
question the court examined was whether to exclude the evidence
of the test results.67 The court cited Westendorf v. Iowa Depart-
either civil or criminal proceedings. See State v. Fasching, 453 N.W.2d 761, 763-64 (N.D.
1990) (holding that only communication may be suppressed and not physical performance
of tests).
58. Prideaux, 310 Minn. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 389. The court stated that revocation of a
driver's license which is a "prerequisite to earning a livelihood" is as much or more of a
penalty than some criminal sanctions. Id. at -, 247 N.W.2d at 389.
59. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
60. Prideaux, 310 Minn at _ 247 N.W.2d at 389.
61. See Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 289 (N.D. 1987) (the results
of the intoxilyzer test are admissible in both the civil and criminal proceedings brought
against a driver).
62. Id. at 287, 290.
63. See Bickler v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 423 N.W.2d 146, 147-48 (N.D.
1988) (law enforcement officials were required to establish that an opportunity for private
consultation had been provided).
64. 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989).
65. Holte v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250, 251 (N.D. 1989).
The relevant part of North Dakota Century Code section 39-20-01 is as follows:
... the law enforcement officer shall also inform the person charged that refusal
of the person to submit to the test determined appropriate will result in a
revocation for up to three years of the person's driving privileges.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01 (Supp. 1989).
66. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 251.
67. Id. The Holte decision was decided by a three person majority consisting of Chief
1991]
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ment of Transportation" in support of its decision refusing to
extend the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings.6 9 The rationale
of the Westendorf court was that the benefit of the evidence at the
hearing outweighed the deterrent effect on police conduct that
the exclusionary rule is supposed to create.70 The Holte court
listed four reasons for adopting the Westendorf rationale: 1) the
need for reliable evidence; 2) the legislature's concern that the
courts accept evidence of fairly administered tests; 3) case law pre-
cedence requiring affirmative refusal to withdraw the implied con-
sent; and 4) the proper role of the administrative hearings in
protecting the public.7' Deciding that the exclusionary rule did
not apply to civil proceedings, the court held the evidence admis-
sible and reinstated the administrative decision.7 2
In Mapp v. Ohio,73 the Supreme Court extended the exclu-
sionary rule to state courts.74 The North Dakota Supreme Court
has applied the exclusionary rule to criminal cases.75 The North
Dakota Supreme Court, in State v. Phelps, stated that the purpose
of the rule is to protect against "unwarranted intrusions" and to
uphold "Judicial integrity. 7 6  Although the exclusionary rule's
acceptance is clear, there are critics who suggest examining alter-
natives to the extreme position of total exclusion of the evidence.77
Approximately one month after Holte, the North Dakota
Supreme Court decided the case of Evans v. Backes.7 s In Evans,
the court found that the commissioner at the administrative hear-
Justice Erickstad, Justice Vande Walle, and Justice Gierke. Id. at 252. See supra note 51 for
a comparison of the justices who were in the majority in the Kuntz decision.
68. 400 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa 1987).
69. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 252. The exclusionary rule, as announced in Weeks v. United
States, called for the exclusion of the evidence which was obtained through improper
means, such as illegal searches and seizures. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914) (permitting the use of the evidence which was obtained illegally was prejudicial
error). This doctrine was implemented to deter law enforcement officials from trying to
obtain evidence in violation of constitutional protections. Id. at 390, 392.
70. Westendorf v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 400 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa 1987).
71. See Holte v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250, 252 (N.D.
1989) (Holte adoption of the Westendorf rationale).
72. Id. The dissent in Holte noted that, due to a plea agreement, the motorist's license
was suspended for 364 days, thus making the case moot. Id. at 254. The majority did not
address this issue. Id.
73. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
74. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
75. State v. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d 769, 773 (N.D. 1980). Phelps dealt with criminal
charges of burglary and arson. Id. at 771. The North Dakota Supreme Court stated, "we
agree with the rationale of the Iowa Supreme Court in refusing to extend the exclusionary
rule to civil proceedings .. " Holte v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d
250, 252 (N.D. 1989).
76. Phelps, 297 N.W.2d at 774.
77. 62 JUDICATURE 351, 352 (1979). The author argues that, "[t]he illogical penalty of
total exclusion of evidence is damaging to the cause of justice." Id. at 356.
78. 437 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1989).
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ing had failed to make a factual determination as to whether the
motorist was denied his right to counsel and, therefore, remanded
the case.7 9 The court stated that the determination of whether he
was denied his right to counsel was critical because if he was, then
his refusal to take the test was not a refusal under North Dakota
Century Code section 39-20-01.8 0 The supreme court in Evans
reaffirmed the Kuntz decision as to what constitutes a refusal
under this statute."' The Evans decision appears to address the
question of whether the right to counsel does apply to DUI pro-
ceedings and answers this question affirmatively: even in the light
of Holte, there is still a right to counsel.12
The central point of law examined in Fasching v. Backes8 3 is
whether a motorist has a right to consult counsel prior to taking an
intoxilyzer test, and if this right exists, then the ramifications of its
denial.8 4 The court in Fasching followed Holte, holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to civil administrative hearings.8 5
Therefore, the results of the intoxilyzer tests were admissible and
the suspension was upheld. 6 Because the intoxilyzer test was
"fairly administered" and "properly admitted," the court declined
to address the question of whether Fasching was denied counsel.8 7
The Fasching court reiterated and adopted the rationale of
the Iowa Supreme Court, which held that the benefits of using the
results of the intoxilyzer test outweigh the possibility of the exclu-
sionary rule deterring future unlawful conduct by law enforce-
ment officials.88 The court also stated in dicta that the district
court misinterpreted North Dakota Century Code section 29-05-
20 when it read the statute to not only allow for the right of the
accused to seek counsel but to include the right of counsel to see
the accused. 9 While the court admitted it was possible to gram-
matically construe the statute to extend the right to both parties,
the court stated that that reading was inconsistent with prece-
79. Evans v. Backes, 437 N.W.2d 848, 849 (N.D. 1989).
80. Id. at 850. See supra note 65 for the text of the relevant portions of the North
Dakota Century Code section 39-20-01.
81. Evans v. Backes, 437 N.W.2d 848, 850 (N.D. 1989).
82. Id. at 851.
83. 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990).
84. Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324, 325 (N.D. 1990).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 326.
87. Id. But cf. Evans v. Backes, 437 N.W.2d 848, 851 (N.D. 1989) (remanded for a
determination of the critical issue of whether the motorist was denied his right to counsel).
88. Fasching, 452 N.W.2d at 325.
89. Id. at 326. The court clearly indicates that section 29-05-20 of the North Dakota
Century Code only gives the client the right to seek counsel and does not give the attorney
the right to seek the client. Id.
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dent.9 ° The court then reversed the district court and affirmed
the commissioner's decision.91
Justice Levine dissented, arguing that the decision severely
limits both Kuntz and Bickler v. North Dakota State Highway
Commissioner,9 2 by denying the accused a reasonable opportunity
to seek counsel.93 The dissent urged that the exclusionary rule be
applied to civil proceedings, citing several cases in support of this
contention.9 4  In addition, the dissent urged that section 39-20-
07(5) of the North Dakota Century Code allows the evidence to be
admitted only when "the sample was properly obtained and the
test was fairly administered."9 " Justice Levine raised the question
of how a test can be classified as either "fairly administered" or
"properly obtained" when it was taken in violation of the motor-
ist's right to counsel.96 The dissent's concern is that the integrity
and fairness of the proceeding cannot be maintained without the
use of the exclusionary rule because the motorist is no longer pro-
tected: "the stench of impropriety and unfairness is rank."9 7
The Fasching decision legitimized the Holte decision, which
Justice Meschke had alleged was only an advisory opinion because
when it was decided the facts left the issue moot." Fasching sends
a mixed signal to the citizens of North Dakota. On the one hand it
stands for the premise that the exclusionary rule does not apply to
civil proceedings, thereby allowing the results of any chemical
tests taken to be admitted.9 On the other hand, the Evans deci-
sion, decided after Holte, reaffirmed Kuntz and leld that the
determination of whether the motorist was denied his right to
counsel was critical.100 It is unclear why this determination is
90. Id. The court's statement that North Dakota Century Code section 29-05-20 was
meant to give a client the right to seek counsel but not the right of counsel to seek the client
appears to be dicta because, immediately before making that statement, the court said,
"[w]hfle not being relevant in this case .. ." Fasching, 452 N.W.2d at 326.
91. Id.
92. 423 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1988).
93. Fasching, 452 N.W.2d at 326.
94. Id. In support of its position, the dissent cites the following cases in which the
exclusionary rule was held to apply to civil proceedings: Whisenhunt v. Dep't of Public
Safety, 746 P.2d 1298 (Alaska 1987); Prideaux v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 310 Minn. 405,
247 N.W.2d 385 (1976); Gooch v. Spradling, 523 S.W.2d 861 (Mo.Ct.App. 1975); Price v.
North Carolina Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 36 N.C. App. 698, 245 S.E.2d 518 (1978).
95. Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324, 326 (N.D. 1990).
96. Id. According to Justice Levine, the majority fails to explain its rationale and
merely states that "there is no evidence to suggest that Fasching's intoxilyzer test was
improperly administered." Id. at 325-26. The majority does not address the question of
whether it was "properly obtained." Id. at 326.
97. Fasching, 452 N.W.2d at 326 (Levine, J., dissenting).
98. Holte v. North Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250, 254 (N.D. 1989).
99. Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324, 326 (N.D. 1990).
100. Evans v. Backes, 437 N.W.2d 848, 850 (N.D. 1989).
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important because, regardless of the determination, the evidence
will be admitted.1 1 The result of these cases is to emphasize
whether the tests are refused.' 0 2 If the tests are taken, then Fasch-
ing and Holte control and the evidence is admissible regardless of
whether the motorist's right to counsel was denied.103 However,
under Kuntz, if the motorist is denied counsel and then refuses to
take the tests, this does not constitute a refusal under section 39-
20-01 of the North Dakota Century Code, and the suspension will
not be upheld.10 4 It is apparently clear that a majority of the court
has determined that motorists, upon arrest and prior to submitting
to chemical testing, have a qualified right to counsel. 10 5 It is also
clear that a different majority interprets the exclusionary rule to
be inapplicable to civil proceedings. 1' 6
The North Dakota courts have struggled for a long time with
the issue of when there is a right to counsel and what the ramifica-
tions are of denying this right. 107 In light of Fasching and Kuntz,
the legislature needs to address this dilemma.' 08 An examination
of how other jurisdictions have dealt with this problem may help
achieve a workable solution.109 One possible solution to this prob-
lem was stated quite clearly by the Honorable Judge Schneider:
"Perhaps California's statutory solution is the better route, provid-
ing for a pecuniary penalty for a violation of the consultation stat-
ute, thus perhaps eliminating the policy for having a civil
exclusionary rule. But that requires legislation. In the interim, this
exclusionary rule applies."" 0 California's approach appears to
deter unlawful police conduct by imposing a penalty while still
allowing for the use of reliable evidence."' This would be an
101. Fasching, 452 N.W.2d at 326.
102. See generally Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990); Holte v. North
Dakota State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989); Evans v. Backes, 437 N.W.2d
848 (N.D. 1989); Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1987) (motorists
who are denied the right to counsel are protected if they refuse the test, but are not
protected if they have submitted to testing).
103. Fasching v. Backes, 452 N.W.2d 324 (N.D. 1990); Holte v. North Dakota State
Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989).
104. Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 288 (N.D. 1987).
105. See id. (three justice majority).
106. See Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 252 (three justice majority).
107. See, e.g., Kuntz, 405 N.W.2d at 285; Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 250; Fasching, 452
N.W.2d at 324 (these cases demonstrate the court's difficulty in this area).
108. See generally Kuntz, 405 N.W.2d at 285; Fasching, 452 N.W.2d at 324
(demonstrating the need for the legislature to clarify the situation).
109. See generally Fasching v. Backes, No. 15700 at 10 (D. N.D. Aug. 30, 1989) (Judge
Schneider examined reasonable alternatives).
110. Fasching v. Backes, No. 15700 at 11 (D. N.D. Aug. 30, 1989) (order reversing
commissioner's decision).
111. See generally Fasching v. Backes, No. 15700 at 10 (D. N.D. Aug. 30, 1989)
(suggesting California's approach as a reasonable alternative to the exclusionary rule deters
misconduct).
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effective approach because it balances the public welfare and the
need for safe highways with the right of the individual to receive
fair procedural safeguards.1 1 2
It seems apparent that an alternative approach is needed." 3
The key is for the legislators and judges to examine new concepts
and approaches that will accurately reflect the needs of a modern
society rather than to cling to old rules and court manifested con-
coctions that have clearly outdated their usefulness." 4 California's
approach articulated by Judge Schneider appears to be the most
sensible approach. 115
Lawrence E. King
112. See generally id. (citing the California section which penalizes police misconduct
but still protects highways by not allowing the evidence to be excluded).
113. See generally 62 JUDICATURE 351, 352 (1979) (the author criticizes the
exclusionary rule).
114. Id.
115. See generally id. at 355-56 (the author is critical of distorting old doctrines rather
than creating new ones).
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